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Abstract 
 
Speech Act is an influential theory on the actual communicative 
function of language and tries to answer to what extend impartial 
interaction is possible between speakers. The theory was first 
developed by Austin and Searl. They argued that order-words have 
primary meaning and clearly convey the message of the speaker. 
Derrida challenged the theory and disposed the argument. Using 
Speech acts and Derrida‟s disposal, Deleuze and Guattari brought a 
new perspective to the argument and developed a new ideas different 
from the ones already existed. This paper aims to discuss to what extent 
Austen, Searl, Derrida Deleuze and Guattari contributed to the 
communication theory. 
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Is there safe and impartial communication? Does speech act theory 
provide us with the solutions to the problems of safe and impartial 
communication? These are the questions we are going to deal with in the 
present paper. Firstly, the present paper proposes to discuss Austin and 
Searl‟s‟ theory of speech act, then refers to Derrida‟s objection. Thirdly, 
Deleuze and his theory of language and order-words will be discussed 
referring to the possibility of safe and impartial communication. The 
research will be descriptive; we will discuss and explain the possibility of 
safe and impartial communication in the works of Austin, Derrida and 
Deleuze.  
 
Communication is a function of language and it is carried out by speech 
in spoken language. Speech is the shorter or longer strings of linguistic 
items used in order to express particular purpose and includes both 
written and spoken text. Speech is dependent on the will of the speaker 
and therefore it is totally individual (Gallaway, 1994: 184). Language on 
the other hand, is entirely social and changes from one speech 
community to another. Speech is also social. The communication is a 
social activity. Speech, being the medium of communication, depends on 
the linguistic knowledge and competence of the speaker. If a speaker 
knows the language, he can speak and communicate properly.  
 
There are some rules that regulate and determine the way we 
communicate. A speaker of the language has to be careful about the 
quantity. That is, he/she has to make a statement as informative as it is 
required. When one is asked „who is that person?‟, the correct answer 
would be „she is Alice, daughter of Mr. Jon‟. The uncooperative answer 
to the question would be „she is a girl‟ or „she is Alice, daughter of Mr. 
Jon, 15 years old, a university student‟. One has to balance his/her speech 
for a correct communication. The speaker is required to give a true 
answer to the question. One cannot answer the question above like „she is 
Margaret‟ if she is Alice. The clear answer is another requirement. The 
answer to the question cannot be „she is a man‟. In addition, one has to 
order the information when speaking. For instance, the answer to the 
question „who is that person‟ cannot be ordered as „she is a daughter of 
Mr. Jon and Alice‟. Instead, the ordered answer is „she is Alice, daughter 
of Mr. Jones‟. 
 
Speech plays many different roles on different occasions. For example, 
the speech one hears from people shifting furniture „to you … now a bit, 
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… to right‟. This kind of speech controls and directs people‟s physical 
behaviour. In a lecture the role of the speech is to influence the thoughts 
rather than the actions of the listener. Another role of speech is to 
establish or reinforce social relation to recognize the presence of each 
other (Di Pietro, 1994: 84). Speech, then, might be used to ask someone 
to do something, to get information, for the expression of emotion and 
for its own sake. 
 
One particular approach to the functional classification of speech is 
based on speech acts. The philosophers and linguists, following the 
British philosopher J.L. Austin, have developed it. Austin pointed out 
that the study of meaning should not be concentrated on the bald 
statement taken out of context because language in speech can be used 
for many functions such as promises, invitations, and requests and so on. 
In some cases we use speech to perform an action (Austin, 1975: 375). In 
English a set of verbs, which Austin termed as performative verbs, 
enable the speaker, to perform an act by using one of them in the first 
person present. Examples of such utterances, also called performative 
utterances, are „I sentence you to ten years in prison‟, „I warn you to 
obey‟, „I beg you to help me.‟ In these examples, the speaker explicitly 
performs an act through speaking. What Austin and his followers have 
tried to provide is to formulate different functions of speech in terms of 
general theory of social activity. Some forms of speech, even they do not 
contain explicitly performative verbs, may serve to perform acts 
implicitly. For example, „I will come to the meeting‟ does not actually 
contain the verb promise but implies that a promise is being made. 
 
The utterance performs an act without explicitly naming it. “An utterance 
which has the significance of an act is termed an illocutionary act:” 
(Wolffson, 1989: 30). The speech act theorists refer to the force of 
utterance when they describe the performing of such on illocutionary act. 
From this they drive the notion that utterances may have illocutionary 
force so that they are interpreted as specific kinds of acts. This kind of 
categorization of speech acts has been very useful to describe the 
problems in communication and in translation. 
 
Problems of the no translatability of the illocutionary force and indirect 
speech acts are another point. An indirect speech act is the one in which 
the form and function do not coincide. „Can you close the door?‟ may be 
an indirect request or may be interpreted as a simple request for 
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information. Austin also mentions about Perlocutionary force. In certain 
cases it is the inherent function of the speech act to explain beliefs. „He 
will soon be leaving‟ can be classified as a promise if one believes at the 
news. Perlocutionary force concerns the „effects‟ of the act whether 
intended or actual.      
 
Social interaction and speech act are categorized according to their 
inherent properties and their effect. For instance, there is a distinction 
between fighting and winning. The concepts used in classifying speech 
acts will be typical of cultural concepts and they change from one society 
to the other. Utterances generally serve for more than one function at the 
same time; therefore, they are not easily classified. Among the speakers 
of middle-class American English a compliment may serve as a greeting 
or an expression of gratitude. In addition, utterances may have more than 
one function and may take several forms. Speech act theory tries to 
capture all the possible functions of language by classifying the kinds of 
action that can be performed by speech. Language becomes a chain of 
utterances defined in terms of speaker‟s intention and belief and speech 
is organized in terms of a set of conversational maxims.  
 
The intention of the speaker and the context of utterance are the basics 
for safe and true communication. But how do people know which speech 
act is intended, if each act can use the syntactic structure typically 
associated with one of the other? A possible answer is to specify 
happiness conditions or felicity conditions- circumstances under which it 
would be appropriate to interpret something as a particular type of speech 
act. For example, if a genuine command has been given, the hearer must 
be physically able to identify the object involved. Even this partial 
statement of the felicity conditions for commands would probably enable 
someone to identify „pick up that book‟ and „That book oughtn‟t to be on 
the floor‟ as genuine commands, and „go jump in the lake!‟ and „Gird up 
thy loins‟ as pseudo commands. If one can fully identify the felicity 
condition for each type of speech act, then one is able to move towards 
safe and impartial communications (Aitchison, 1994: 96). 
 
There are certain circumstances in which speech cannot perform the 
presupposed effect. Performatives fail when for instance acted by an 
actor on the stage or introduced in a poem or spoken soliloquy, since we 
use language in such cases in a special way and we are unserious 
(Austin, 1975: 380). It is important to be able to make distinctions 
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between the happy and the unhappy; between the normal and the 
parasitic because without these distinctions Speech Act Theory would 
not be possible. If one could not maintain a general difference between 
promises made by people playing roles on stage and promises made by 
the same people off stage, then one could not say that the „promise made 
off stage did not entail. These utterances will have context that are proper 
to them (e.g. one says „I declare you man and wife‟ at a wedding) (e-
anglais com/thesis.html). For Searl, distinction is made solely in terms of 
the utterer‟s (or writer‟s) intentions. Initially, this makes his theory look 
more impoverished than Austin‟s since the differences between plays and 
novels, and real life, seem to be more than a matter of what their authors 
intended. Indeed such differences seem to be textual and contextual 
(ibid.).  
 
In the fictitious circumstances language is under etiolation which means 
fictional, pale, quotational, repeatable, parasitical, and therefore never 
intended to classical-metaphysical procedure. Derrida is critical about the 
felicity condition and argues that the serious language needs a context 
and the intention of the speaker who is sincere and genuine. In addition 
to the intention, the speaker has to follow the procedure. The presence, 
then, in the speech act theory is at the center. In the speech act theory, as 
opposed to the serious and appropriate use of language, there is also non-
serious language consisting of absence of serious intention. The language 
is non-serious because it is repeated, quoted, reapplied  and taken out of 
the original context. 
 
Derrida argues that Austin‟s theory of language surrounds language like 
a ditch into which any language might fall. He claims that Austin tries to 
keep language at home and imprisons language into the context. The 
agony or etiolation that violates the safe and impartial communication 
becomes the standard case in Derrida, since language in such cases can 
be cut from the sender and receiver. When the sender and receiver of the 
speech disappear, the third party can decipher the aberrant. The ditch is 
deciphered through writing which repeats itself. Repeatability of the 
utterance undermines the context and produces as many implications as 
possible. Derrida insists that writing, through citation and grafting, 
reproduces the context and free the speech from the safe home and prison 
of Austin: „Iterability undermines the context as a final governor of the 
meaning and implies elsewhere the possibility for citation and grafting‟ 
(Derrida, 1968: 152).  One can lift out a sequence of words from a 
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written context and make an extract with it, or one can insert stolen word 
into other chains of writing.  Speech is also iterable, citable and graftable. 
For instance, the sentence „my husband and I‟ can be iterable as „she 
began the speech „my father and I‟‟, or as „last week I said‟, „she began 
the speech‟ „my father and I‟. Then, speech, like writing, can be cut from 
its context and from all its presences of its moment of utterance. The 
effect of speech and the intention of the speaker do not exclude 
iterability, citation and grafting because repeatability derails the 
possibility for safe and impartial communication, yet without 
repeatability there could be no recognizable signs (ibid.). 
 
The iterability derails the context; therefore, there is no certain, clear-cut 
context of speech. Yet there is still context but the context is no longer at 
the center that controls the meaning. Likewise, there is still intention but 
it cannot be completely present in an utterance or in the context. 
Intention, like context, never governs the entire meaning and system of 
utterance (Collins and Mayblin, 1996: 51-55). Then, communication 
means transactions, repetitions, quotation and reinsertion. 
Communication cannot be taken as a guaranteed, masterable passage of 
meaning with a proper context and certain intention, since language is 
non-masterable dissemination, therefore, cannot convey exactly what 
someone means or thinks.   
 
Derrida sees Austin‟s characterization of the proper context as ordinary, 
normal and serious, and thinks that the concomitant exclusion from 
consideration of non-serious utterances enables conditions of Speech Act 
Theory. He sees his investigation as showing that this putative 
foundation and the attempted exclusion of the parasitic are arbitrary and, 
in fact impossible. He affirms the permanent, structural possibility of 
parasitism and, as a consequence, the impossibility of Austinian and 
Searlean Speech Act Theory.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari are post-structuralists. They deal with the 
underlying structures that enable written and speaking communication 
within language. They argue that there is an abstract machine within 
language, which enables to define it as a homogenous system. It is 
generally accepted that language is informational and communicational. 
The study of language- linguistics as we call it, is divisionary dividing 
language into specific parts like syntax, semantic and pragmatics and 
trying to figure out the system that operates within the language. Each 
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pat of language has its own rules and order. Students learn rules and 
orders to communicate through language. Compulsory education‟s 
function is to teach elementary units of language available for 
communication (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:135).  
 
Deleuze and Guattari, unlike Austin and Searl, and Derrida, do not take 
speech act theory as a separate area for investigation. They take the 
illocutionary use of language within the notion of order-word, and states 
that both written and spoken language is ordered. In speech, order has 
three main rules namely, opening, turn taking and closing. A speaker 
opens up speech with a statement, the listener carries on and the one, 
who begins, ends the communication. In written language the order is 
perpetuated through syntax, grammar and Subject+Verb+Object 
agreement (ibid.).  
 
The structure both in written and spoken language operates through 
syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations. In syntagmatic relation a sign 
enters only into association with a certain set of other signs to be 
grammatically correct and semantically meaningful. For instance „the 
man cooks the fish can be syntagmatically restated „Ali cooks the fish‟ or 
„The fish is cooked by Ali‟ but not „The fish cooks man‟ or „The cook 
the fish man‟. The first sentences are syntagmatically ordered and 
grammatically correct but the later statements are syntagmatically 
wrong-ordered and grammatically incorrect. In a paradigmatic relation a 
sign has a number of associated meanings and can be substituted by other 
signs. „I like tulip or I like roses can substitute for instance, „I like 
flower‟ without changing the category of signs.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari name the process that operates through order-word 
in spoken and written language as strata and discuss the process of 
stratification with relation to the notion of subjectification and 
significance.  Subjectification operates as follows; there is a subject of 
enunciation who expresses himself in the form of specific statements like 
„I think …, I believe …, or I want …‟ . There is another subject what 
Deleuze and Guattari calls subject of statement. It is the spoken subject 
„I‟ which gains its meaning from the syntactical relation it has with the 
other words in the sentence. The „I‟ of the sentence and the spoken 
subject are not same. They come together in arbitrary relation through 
conjugation. Descartes‟ cogito „I think therefore I am‟ is an example for 
this relation. The first I is conjugated with „think‟ and the second „I‟ 
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refers to the subject of statement. Through conjugation one is subjectified 
and subjectification allows only thinking and desiring proper to the sense 
of identity (Goodchild, 1996:148-151). Each citizen learns what he can 
and cannot do through subjectification and becomes socialized. In this 
sense education at schools does not „only instruct the rule of grammar 
but also gives order and command. The significance is the operation of 
language as syntagmatic and paradigmatic strata. The function of 
significance is subjectification.  
 
According to Deleuze and Guattari, the speech acts -as predicated by 
Austin and Searl for safe and impartial communication and as criticized 
by Derrida- is what makes subjectification (socialization) possible. 
Language and statement say very clearly what should be retained. That 
is, language demands and grammar is a power marker before it is a 
syntactical marker (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:83-103). Sociability 
assumes language and it is likely that it will be organized by signs of 
imperative kinds like command, judgment, and performative words 
(Gatens, 1995) that transmit or engender effect and have pragmatic 
implications.  
 
The meaning and coerciveness of order-word depends upon its socially 
accepted significance. That is, speech act presupposes social unconscious 
within the collective assemblage of enunciation. Order-word is functional 
and conjugates certain socially defined actions and changes the social 
situation with statements that effectively accomplish them (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1987: 85). For instance, „sit down‟, „stop here‟ do not only 
operate as command but also function to organize acts, effects, desires 
and state of affairs depending on situation in which they are uttered; 
when a judge says „I sentence you 10 years imprisonment‟, a defendant 
may be transformed into criminal. 
 
Deleuze and Guattari do not limit speech act theory within certain 
situation. They argue that illocutionary use of language may create new 
kinds of social situation according to the contexts they are used. For 
instance, „how could he have said such a thing? I will never trust him 
again‟ does not only operate as a question but also delivers a judgment 
and marks the end of one situation starting the beginning of new and 
different one. The speaker promises not to enter any social relation with 
the listener. Every statement refers to further statements. „Where were 
you last night?‟ have different answers for different people; for the 
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beloved it may connote „do not make me feel lonely‟, for the boss it may 
refer to order „tell me‟, for a friend it may be warning „ don‟t betray me‟. 
In this sense, sign always refers to other signs and further statements.  
 
The order-word is formed in two ways; conjugation or conjunction. The 
conjugation is formed by verb „to be‟. In the sentence, „he is guilty‟ A is 
B and B defines the limit of A. In the second use of order-word the 
statement is formed by conjunction „and‟. A Thousand Pleautus (1987) is 
an example for the second usage where the sentences are not conjugated 
via signification but by the way in which each sentence acts upon each 
other to change the meaning and each statement acts as implicit 
presuppositions for further statements. The proper use of order-word, 
through conjugation or conjunction, requires linguistic and 
communicative competence. Language and power subjectify through the 
proper use of language in written and spoken interaction.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari make a distinction between major and minor use of 
language and like Derrida, investigate the lines for escape from the 
ordinary use of order-word. Instead of repeatability or iterability of 
written language, they argue the predictability of further statements in 
written and spoken interactions. The predictability of further statements 
does not restrict enunciation within certain context. When a subject 
attains linguistic and cultural incompetence and rejects to use the 
repeated appeal to the same set of order-word, he/she begins to create 
new text, new order-word and new statements through which language is 
deterritorialized and the subject of enunciation becomes „foreigner to 
one‟s own tongue‟. This is common in literature and in art where minor 
language is used. Kafka, for instance, uses minor language and 
deterritorialized major language. The minor use of language is referential 
and turns the death-sentence, dead metaphor and verdict and gives the 
subject the warning to flee from the fixed and socially determined and 
restricted situations. Desire is transformed to its own situation and the 
outside situation where social unconscious and subject survives becomes 
standard. The distinction between external and internal circumstances is 
no longer effective.  
 
According to Deleuze and Guattari, this process is accomplished through 
signification (syntagmatic and paradigmatic relation) and stratification of 
the social context. Unlike Austin and Searl -who argue that speech acts 
are created by certain social institutions and situations, they argue that it 
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is language that constitutes certain institutions and situations through 
signification. However, they agree with Austin and Searl and differ from 
Derrida in that there is a distinction between parole and langue and 
speech acts break this distinction within the illocutionary use of 
language. This is the incorporeal transformation of language Incorporeal 
transformation is recognizable by its instantaneousness, its immediacy 
and simultaneity of the statement (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:86). They 
argue that judge‟s statement that transforms the accused into convict is 
pure instantaneous act in which the body and the sign act together. In 
such case the action (crime) and passion (penalty) affect the body of the 
convict. Deleuze and Guattari name this is a process incorporeal 
transformation. In a common usage there is non-corporeal 
transformation.  For instance, the expression „I love you‟ is non-
corporeal use of language, since the statement does not affect the body 
but expresses the attribute of the body (ibid.) whereas, „ready?‟ as a 
statement of question is an example for incorporeal use of language. 
 
It is also argued that the speech acts or illocutionary use of language 
exists with the presence of other. In the Logic of Sense (1987) Deleuze 
argues that Robinson‟s world is one in which the other is absent and as 
such the prohibitions or commands embedded in order-word are also 
absent. Robinson is free to compose and command. Order-word, in this 
sense, expresses a possible world as if it were the only and inevitable 
world, and an appeal to obey. Interaction between two characters (Ben 
and Gus) in The Dumb Waiter (1989) by Harold Pinter exemplifies the 
relation between authority and language (p, 125-29): 
Ben. Go and light it. 
Gus. Light what? 
Ben. The kettle. 
Ben. You mean the gas. 
   …….. 
Ben. (Powerfully) If I mean go and light the kettle I mean go and light 
the kettle 
Gus. How can you light a kettle? 
   ……. 
Ben. Light the kettle! It is a common usage 
Gus. I think you have got it wrong. 
Ben. What do you mean? 
Gus. They say put on the kettle 
Ben. Who says? 
H. Baktir                                                                                            Speech Act Theory 
Epiphany: Journal of Transdisciplinary Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2, (2013) © Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences 
 [110] 
Gus. My mother 
    …….. 
Ben. Who‟s the senior partner here, me or you? 
Gus. You. 
Ben. THE KETTLE YOU FOOL! 
Gus. All right, all right. 
 
 
After a while the invisible but authoritative voice speaks from the tube. 
Ben says to Gus: 
Ben. You know what he said? Light the kettle! Not put on the kettle! Not 
light the gas! But light the kettle! (p, 140). 
 
The voice most probably belongs to Ben‟s senior partner who decides for 
what it is. Austen and Searle and Derrida would interpret the interaction 
between Ben and Gus as a failure of felicity condition. However, Deleuze 
and Guattari argue that the subject rejects to use the repeated appeal to 
the same set of order-word. Gus tries to create a new text, a new order-
word, new statements which deterritorialise (1987:4) the language and 
make the subject of enunciation free. According to Deleuze and Guattari, 
these kinds of breaks are lines of flight (ibid.,) which give the subject an 
opportunity to reject the strata. The subject attempts to convey his real 
desire. Yet the subject is stratified by the authority (invisible machine) 
which instructs to appeal the rules. There is no way to escape in the 
ordinary language. Therefore, the subject has to obey the authority and 
give the required answer(s) (cooperative principles or illocutionary acts) 
to communicate properly. There is no place to express one‟s own desire 
in the strata.  The flights of lines (Deleuze and Guattari, 1989:3) exist in 
literary language which deterritorialises the common language and flees 
from the fixed and socially determined meanings. If there are lines for 
flight desires….are transformed to their own situations and people create 
opportunity for free and safe communication.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari, like Derrida, think that it is not possible to 
discover the intention of the speaker or statement, since each statement 
predicates the former and refers to the further ones (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1987). Language distorts the intention of the speaker as they 
exemplify in A Thousand Pleautus: 
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The teacher, at the top of the stairs, asks a question that is passed on by 
servants who distorts it at each step of the way and the student, below in 
the courtyard, returns an answer that is also distorted at each stage of the 
trip back (1987:76). 
 
Derrida claims that the iterability of the utterance derails the channel and 
the intention is lost. Deleuze and Guattari seem to agree with Derrida. 
Yet they differ in that they dwell on spoken language and pragmatic 
function of the statement rather than, written signs. Like Derrida, they 
claim that there is no certain meaning and reference. Each statement 
refers to further statements. The sentences „Jon realizes that Mary is a 
German‟, „Jon does not realize that Mary is a German‟ predicates and 
presupposes that „Mary is a German‟. Then, each statement can be cut 
off from the moment of utterance and can be used in a different context. 
Each statement has multiple voices and each statement is indirect 
discourse. In particular, minor use of language unlocks the illocutionary 
use of language, displaces the context and expresses the existence of 
different world and possibility for new assemblage of enunciation 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:78).  
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